The Biosafety Protocol has been adopted; negotiations are closed. Although while discussing over its application, technical debates among government delegates could turn to political matters, particularly about labeling and conflict settlement…

Courrier de la planète: What are the stakes of the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee for the Biosafety Protocol?

Eric Schoonejeans: The negotiation stage ended with the formal adoption of the Biosafety Protocol in Montreal on January 2000. The current step consists in preparing its entry into force. The preparation process, technical rather than political, remains very important because now the conditions that are essential to the implementation of the Protocol’s arrangements must be gathered. If the Intergovernmental Committee fails to do so, the agreement will be ineffective. It is all the more significant since the Biosafety Protocol is an agreement on procedures much more than an agreement on general policy.

he first stake for its application is to get as many countries as possible to ratify the agreement. That is to say to provide them with the legal, technical (risk assessment), and managerial means necessary to benefit from the procedures defined within the Protocol and to fulfill the ensuing requirements. This is particularly the case for the developing countries, which currently have no national legal frame regarding the products stemming from genetic engineering.

In December, the Intergovernmental Committee will discuss two major technical topics. One of them is the strengthening of the developing countries’ capacities. Let us suppose that a State being a Party in the Protocol is notified about an export of a living modified organism cargo according to the Advance Informed Agreement. After a given period, this state must decide whether they accept or reject the importation, and eventually, under which conditions. However, they must have some specific capacities in order to decide, especially they should be enabled to appraise the risks. The second major topic of the meeting is about the transfer of information, especially through the Protocol’s Clearing-House Mechanism (CHM). It is important for two reasons. On the one hand, in order to have the procedure effective, States should be provide with information: characteristics of the traded products, decisions made in other countries, list of relevant experts, etc. On the second hand, the CHM has an operational role to play facing some procedures. On the procedure relating to living modified organisms directly intended for food and processing, the fact that the CHM is providing information about the importation authorization given by a State may define the starting point of a possible authorization procedure for importation of these products toward other States.

Courrier de la planète: Dispute is harsh between the defenders of a voluntary labeling of biotech products and those being for a mandatory labeling. Will these political stakes be discussed during this meeting?

Eric Schoonejeans: It is true that the question of product identification is a greatly political concern. The European Union has adopted a stronger set of rules than the Protocol’s arrangements. It is also strongly debated in the United States: in October, the head of the Environment Protection Agency claimed that she was favorable to a mandatory labeling for GMOs. To come to an agreement on the Protocol, the European Union had to accept several dissatisfying arrangements on product labeling and identification, and this will be discussed again in December. The Committee will have to go through every current arrangement related to handling, transportation, and packaging. However, if this meeting gets too political, this might block the Protocol’s implementation process. This would be a serious defeat for the Protocol’s supporters. The priority is to allow the enforcement of a practical protocol, and this in a very short term as only two Committee meetings have been scheduled.

Courrier de la planète: Since the European Union is already provided with stricter rules, why is it so important to negotiate?

Eric Schoonejeans: For several reasons. First of all, it is related to the very nature of the risk of genetic dissemination towards the environment. If we cannot reach minimum harmonization of the rules related to biosafety, there are considerable possibilities of transboundary damage. At the European level, we must ensure that the States which are not members of EU, being totally free about their environmental policies however set a comparable level of protection. Moreover, the Protocol provides a frame to the EU stricter laws on biosafety facing the international law. In spite of being isolated, the EU rules would then come under a frame agreed on a multilateral level.

Courrier de la planète: The links between the Protocol and other instruments of the international law, particularly those related to trade and food safety were not namely scheduled for the meeting. Could the matter be discussed however?

Eric Schoonejeans: This matter has already been settled and there is no reason to get to it again, except for defining the way they should be implemented. The Agreement’s Preamble says that the Protocol should be applied in accordance with the other principles of the international law, thus with the World Trade Organization rules as well as with those of other environmental instruments such as the Convention on Biological Diversity. Consistency facing other international standards should be studied for each case.

It is therefore possible to set a dispute settlement mechanism within the Protocol respecting these requirements. This will certainly be discussed in Montpellier, and should be done by taking into account the links with the WTO Conflict Settlement Body. Nevertheless, concerning the relationship with the WTO, special care should be taken that no new arrangement is negotiated within the WTO frame that would refute the arrangements set in Montreal. It is essentially outside that the Protocol’s standards should be strengthened.

Besides, the Protocol provides to rely on other relevant international organizations’ works on food safety or on environmental risks. It is obvious then that, concerning the sanitary safety of biotechnology ensued products, the Protocol will mainly rely on the works of the Codex Alimentarius >Read page 21, on which advisory standards the WTO refers to. It would be useless to duplicate what the Codex has done while less than a year ago, the Codex has created a Committee chaired by Japan dealing with biosafety matters on biotechnology ensued food. Indeed, the Codex Commission can be criticized as lacking of democratic spirit; still there is no reason to create another group aiming to examine the same questions. The Codex’s lack of democracy relies on the weigh the various governments may obtain within the Secretariats of the different of the various technical working groups rather than on the influence of the industries’ lobby. It is not much of a question of transparency than a question of technical and financial means, particularly for the developing countries. In the respect of the consistency of international standards, it is essential to make good use of the skills of every existing organization, how imperfect may they be.

Courrier de la planète: According to the Protocol, what part can the non-governmental organizations play within the debates?

Eric Schoonejeans: The Convention on Biological diversity provides the NGOs with true participation. During the Protocol’s negotiations, transparency and participation were quite remarkable; the very last phases of the negotiations were even held before the press. In Montreal, a number of associations were permanently demonstrating outside the place despite it was 30° Celsius below and although there was nothing stopping them coming inside! That was a political choice. NGOs are welcome and can actively take part to the works. The matter is far different from what takes place with the WTO, the International Monetary Funds, or the World Bank.